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terça-feira, abril 07, 2026
Iran Thinks It Can Win a Long War
By Dina Esfandiary and Ziad Daoud
Iran
didn’t want this war, but now it has reasons to prolong it. That’s a
problem for President Trump, who appears unable to reopen the Strait of
Hormuz despite his threats. It’s a problem for the global economy,
which is buckling under a surge in energy costs. It’s a problem for Gulf
leaders hemorrhaging oil revenue. And it’ll haunt future American
presidents: Hormuz has been closed once; it can be closed again.
Despite
the climbing death toll and destroyed infrastructure, surging oil
prices are cushioning Iran’s economy against the war’s costs. Iran has
met virtually every strike with a counterstrike, every threat with a
matching threat. Its leaders’ logic is cold but calculated: make this
war so costly for everyone that no one wants to start another. For
Tehran, the goals are simple. The Islamic Republic must survive this
moment and ensure it is not attacked by the United States and Israel
again. To achieve this, Iran believes it must impose a cost — to the
United States and Israel, to the Gulf states’ image of stability and to
the global economy. So far, it’s succeeding: Iran has learned how easy
and comparatively cheap it is to hold the global economy hostage.
For
Tehran, the moment is existential. It faced years of economic hardship
as sanctions and mismanagement resulted in high inflation and a weaker
currency. It also faced political and legitimacy crises — both worsened
by the brutal repression of protests, as well as social and
environmental pressures so severe that dire water shortages prompted the
country’s president to warn Tehran might have to be evacuated. Then
came the American and Israeli onslaught in which officials from both
countries talked openly about regime change in Tehran.
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That
situation led to Iran’s response: ruthless, step-by-step escalation.
Unlike the short war in June, the escalation wasn’t symbolic. Iran
continues to hit the Arab Gulf states where it hurts,
from energy to tourism. Tehran now holds the global economy hostage by
choking off the Strait of Hormuz — a move it long threatened but never
before executed.
Some
saw these moves as unjustified; Tehran saw them as carefully
calibrated. At the beginning of the war, the Iranian military hit
regional energy infrastructure to sabotage production, taking some of
the region’s production temporarily offline. But it was only when Israel
conducted an attack against Iran’s South Pars gas field on March 18
that Iran went for the jugular. After the Israeli attack, Iran targeted energy infrastructure
in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, seemingly aiming
to cause longer-lasting damage. The hit on the world’s largest liquefied
natural gas export facility was so significant that it is likely to
cause an estimated $20 billion of lost revenue and five years of repair. Iran demonstrated it was willing and able to retaliate in kind.
Iran is doing all this on the cheap.
It uses a mix of relatively low-cost drones and missiles to overwhelm
its adversaries’ defenses. Those defenses are more expensive: Iran is deploying
drones worth $20,000 to $50,000 against interceptors worth more than $4
million. It’s also using mines, drones and explosive-rigged boats to
scare off shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Put simply, Tehran is on the
right side of the cost curve.
And while Iranian munitions aren’t unlimited, the country’s military is
getting better at striking targets as the war goes on. They might be
shooting less, but they’re shooting better.
This
dynamic has created two advantages for Iran. First, high oil prices are
hurting the United States but strengthening Iran’s hand. This led to
the Trump administration’s paradoxical policy of relaxing sanctions on
Iranian oil. Second, the closure of the strait is less damaging to Iran
than to its neighbors. Iranian oil exports have fallen only modestly
since the war began, while its neighbors’ exports have tumbled. With the
jump in crude prices, Iran is probably earning more from its oil today
than it did before the war. Even the country’s long-troubled currency
has gained ground.
All this comes at a
cost. Iran continues to sustain heavy bombardment, affecting
residential areas and its energy grid. Tehran has antagonized its
neighbors, several of whom are now calling for Trump to finish the job.
While Iran’s strategy initially surprised its adversaries, over time,
everyone will adjust. The Gulf may find alternatives to the strait,
investing in diversion routes and pipelines. The United States and
regional powers will most likely prepare plans to prevent future
closures of the strait. None of this will help Iran’s new rulers stay in
power. Once the war is over, they will still have to contend with their
internal economic, political, social and environmental crises — as well
as the deaths of many of their fellow leaders.
Iran
didn’t want this war, but it has learned how to use it. The Strait of
Hormuz is a major vulnerability to the global economy. Tehran will
remember the value of being able to close it. That leverage won’t fix
its deep domestic problems. But it will anchor the United States more
firmly in the Middle East, despite years of talk about pivoting away
from the region.