
Gideon Rachman
As a communist, Xi Jinping should be familiar with Marx’s dictum that “All great world historic facts and personages appear, so to speak, twice . . . The first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.”
The meeting this week between Xi, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin has been widely billed as the second coming of the Yalta summit of 1945 between Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin. So are Xi, Trump and Putin the new “big three”? And is their meeting more likely to end in tragedy or farce?
An element of farce is always a strong possibility when Trump is involved. Indeed, in the same work in which Marx made his famous remark about tragedy and farce, he also mused on the circumstances that “made it possible for a grotesque mediocrity to play a hero’s part”. (The mediocrity he had in mind was Napoleon III of France.)
A potentially tragic outcome from the Shenzhen summit is also easy enough to envisage. If things go badly wrong, the three leaders could end up agreeing to recognise each other’s “core interests”, to use a phrase China is fond of.
They could endorse a Russian view of the Ukraine war and a Chinese view of the future of Taiwan. Trump might be given some help over Iran or some “wins” for the US economy.
However, the brevity and structure of the meeting make it unlikely that substantive new deals will be reached. Indeed, for their own reasons, all three leaders may be satisfied with the symbolism of a group photo.
Putin has long been preoccupied by the fear that Russia is losing its status as one of the world’s great powers. Former US president Barack Obama once said that the Russian leader looked like a bored kid at the back of the classroom at international gatherings.
So a photo of the president of Russia standing next to the leaders of the US and China — the two largest global powers — will be a big symbolic win for Putin.
The symbolism of power is also very important for Xi. He has made the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese people” his central theme, and clearly intends to secure a fourth term as leader of the Communist Party next year.
Xi’s domestic legitimacy and his international image are closely intertwined. Both may receive a boost from a summit photo that portrays him as the gracious host at the centre of events — flanked by the visiting presidents of the US and Russia.
After the humiliation of the US midterm elections, Trump may also relish the opportunity to reassert his power and status on the world stage. The Chinese government is expert at stroking the egos of visiting world leaders.
Of course, there is always a chance that a photo opportunity could turn into something more substantial — particularly if the meeting runs over time. Putin may well try to put Ukraine on the agenda. And Trump has a record of veering towards the Russian view on Ukraine after speaking to Putin.
In similar fashion, Trump has echoed Chinese talking points on Taiwan after previous meetings with Xi — for example, warning the Taiwanese last May not to make a destabilising push for independence. But Trump’s statements are so erratic — and open to reversal — that they do not carry the weight of pronouncements by previous US presidents. Even if he does make unexpected concessions in Shenzhen, his aides and allies are likely to water them down after the event.
Trump has said he wants to discuss nuclear disarmament. This is an important topic, since the main nuclear arms-control treaties have lapsed. Nukes are also a favourite subject for the Russians, since their own vast arsenal — the largest in the world — is one of their few remaining claims to great power status.
But China — which is rapidly building up its own smaller stockpile — has made it clear that it is not currently interested in nuclear arms limitation talks. So there is unlikely to be a breakthrough there.
More broadly, the Chinese style of diplomacy is to avoid free-flowing discussions and surprise outcomes. Xi’s preference for sticking rigidly to a prepared script is another reason why the trilateral meeting in Shenzhen is unlikely to produce world-shaking outcomes.
But the most important reason why comparisons with the meeting of the Big Three in 1945 are misleading goes well beyond the leaders involved. We are simply living in very different times.
At Yalta, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin met in the midst of a world war that was remaking the global order. British and American forces had already fought their way into Germany. The Russian army was less than three months away from entering Berlin. The US was six months from dropping the first atomic bomb.
By contrast, today’s “big three” seem much less capable of imposing their will on the world. The US has failed to defeat Iran, after failing to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan.
After more than four years of brutal warfare — longer than it took Stalin to reach Berlin — Putin’s forces are still stuck in eastern Ukraine. And Xi has still not worked out how to subdue Taiwan — an island of 23mn people just 100 miles from China.
Fortunately, we no longer live in a time in which a “big three” can dictate terms to the rest of the world.
FINANCIAL TIMES